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Introduction
Although the modern expression “robot apocalypse” refers to a fear of
technological advance, fear of automation is nothing new. For example, in 1589,
Queen Elizabeth of England refused to grant the inventor of a mechanical knitting
machine a patent, fearing it would put knitters out of work (Ip, 2017). In the early
19th century, English textile artisans called Luddites attempted to prevent the
mechanization of the textile industry, fearing (correctly) that machines would
replace labor in the industry. Even economists such as John Maynard Keynes
worried about widespread technological unemployment “due to our discovery of
means of economising the use of labour outrunning the pace at which we can find
new uses for labour” (Keynes, 1933, p. 3). The newest wave of technological
anxiety also includes fear of artificial intelligence (AI). A 2017 Pew Research
survey found high levels of anxiety about automation and AI, with 72 percent of
respondents expressing worry about a future where robots and computers can do
many human jobs (Smith & Anderson, 2017). The issue—and the anxiety that
surrounds it—is a common topic in the national news cycle. For example, a recent
headline from Business Insider suggests that machines may replace half of human
jobs (Thompson, 2016).
Of course, sensational headlines and exaggerated concerns can cloud an
issue. But history offers plenty examples of disruptive technological change.
Horses and mules once provided a significant part of the work within the economy.
“Horse labor” seemed resistant to technological change. Even between 1840 and
1900, a time when the telegraph replaced the Pony Express and railroads replaced
the stagecoach and Conestoga wagon, the number of horses and mules grew sixfold
to more than 21 million. These animals played an essential role in farm work and
an important role in carrying people and goods across the country in both rural and
urban settings. Most Americans would have found it difficult to imagine an
economy not dependent on horse labor. However, once the right technology came
along, horse labor became obsolete. By 1960, the internal combustion engine
provided most of the “horse power” in the U.S. economy and the population of
horses had dwindled to just three million—a decline of nearly 88 percent
(Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2015). In just over half a century, horse labor had become
uneconomical. Some fear that human labor faces a similar fate—that AI will replace
it.
Economics, which is identified in the National Council for the Social
Studies College, Career, and Civic Life (C3) Framework for Social Studies State
Standards (NCSS, 2013) as one of the four core academic disciplines in social
studies, provides a useful framework to analyze the effects of AI on society. First,
AI provides social studies teachers with a current-issues “hook” that can be used to
link valuable economic content to a relevant, contemporary issue that students care
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about. Second, AI provides these teachers with an issue that connects to key social
justice issues such as economic opportunity and income inequality. Third, AI is the
subject of many articles and lesson specifically designed for social studies teachers
to use in the classroom. And finally, AI gives social studies teachers a chance to
discuss key objectives such as optimal economic policy, college and career
readiness, and investment in higher education. In short, AI is an important topic to
address in the social studies classroom.
This paper provides teachers with the conceptual background required to
address automation and AI within three of the four C3 social studies disciplines
directly and to also include the fourth without much effort. It first addresses the
current discussion of AI, which is rooted in the historical arguments that have been
made since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. It also provides context for
understanding historical people’s “Luddite” perspectives and describes how many
of the same fears exist today relative to AI. This historical perspective is reflected
in the C3 Framework, which requires students to “analyze how historical contexts
shaped and continue to shape people’s perspectives” (D2.His.5.9-12). Second, the
implication that automation and AI may exacerbate inequality pushes societal
discussion about it squarely into the civics realm. This concern aligns with the
public policy proposals voiced by Elon Musk, Bill Gates, and Mark Zuckerberg,
which are described and analyzed in this paper. These proposals connect well with
the C3 Framework, which suggests that students “evaluate public policies in terms
of intended and unintended outcomes, and related consequences” (D2.CIV.13.912). And, of course, many of the core concepts in the discussion about automation
and AI—such as labor markets, income, productivity, economic growth, and
standards of living—are found in economics and are defined and explained in this
paper. While several of the economics C3 Framework standards apply, the most
applicable one in this case requires students to “explain why advancements in
technology and investments in capital goods and human capital increase economic
growth and standards of living” (D2.Eco.13.9-12). And, while one step away from
the content of this paper, the topic is conducive to addressing related issues in
geography. For example, the C3 Framework requires students to “evaluate how
political and economic decisions throughout time have influenced cultural and
environmental characteristics of various places and regions” (D2.Geo.5.9-12).
Key Terms and Concepts
Scarcity lies at the heart of economic thought. It is the central economic problem
and the basis of the economic way of thinking. Scarcity is the condition that exists
because there are not enough resources to produce everyone’s wants. Because
resources are scarce, people must make choices. When they make choices, they
face tradeoffs and incur opportunity costs.
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Economists often describe the production process as a mix of labor and
capital (both physical and human) resources (McConnell, Brue & Flynn, 2012).
Labor is the quantity and quality of human effort directed toward producing goods
and services. It is the work people do for income or, more specifically, wages.
Capital resources (or physical capital) are the tools and equipment that have been
produced and are used to produce other goods and services. They are used
repeatedly in the production process. Capital resources are easily confused with
technology. As economists define it, technology includes the knowledge, processes,
and techniques used to produce goods and services. In other words, technology is
all the intangible features embodied in the physical capital. Think of an iPhone: for
a business, it is physical capital; but the difference between the original iPhone and
the iPhone X is a difference in technology (Wolla, 2018). As the example suggests,
technology changes. This idea is captured in the term technological advance (or
technological progress), which is an advance in overall knowledge in a specific
area. This insight—that output cannot simply be explained by increases in labor
supply, human capital, and accumulation of physical capital alone—resulted in a
Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for Robert Solow, who summarized the idea
well: “In the long term we know the only way to get sustained faster growth is to
have sustained faster technological progress” (USB Nobel Perspectives, n.d., para.
6). Nobel Laureate economist Paul Romer (n.d.) explained technological progress
as growth that springs from better recipes (processes), not just from more cooking
(labor). Human capital is the knowledge and skills that people obtain through
education, experience, and training. Increases in human capital can improve the
productivity of labor resources.
Although the terms robot, automation, and AI are often used
interchangeably, there are distinctions. A robot is any device or algorithm that does
what humans once did, from thermostats to dishwashers to airline search sites.
Unlike other physical capital or forms of technology, robots can be programmed to
perform many tasks and do not need a human operator (Acemoglu & Restrepo,
2017). Robots are very good at doing repetitive tasks that can be programmed ahead
of time. These kinds of routine and repetitive tasks are susceptible to automation,
which is the automatically controlled operation of an apparatus, process, or system
by mechanical or electronic devices. Once a process is automated, the production
can occur without human assistance. Economists Jason Furman and Robert
Seamans (2018) describe AI as “a loose term used to describe a range of advanced
technologies that exhibit human-like intelligence, including machine learning,
autonomous robotics and vehicles, computer vision, language processing, virtual
agents and neural networks” (p, 2). The literature often describes robots and AI as
variations of the same movement toward increasing automation, as will be seen in
the remainder of this paper.
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Underlying the discussion of labor, AI, and automation is the economic
concept of productivity, which is the ratio of output per worker per unit of time. An
increase in productivity enables a firm or an economy to produce the same amount
of output with fewer inputs (or more output with the same level of inputs). For
firms, increased productivity results in lower production costs and higher profits;
when these effects appear for the overall economy, this translates to a higher
standard of living.
Literature Review
Despite the hype and anxiety often expressed in the popular press, economists seem
much less worried than the general population that humans will be replaced by
computers and robots. In fact, many economists are likely to see AI as the latest
chapter in a very long story of technological advance (Autor, 2015). When new
technology is developed, it typically disrupts certain labor markets; but the
economy adjusts in ways that result in more employment (Acemoglu & Restrepo,
2018).
In contrast, the popular perception and views expressed in the media often
incite anxiety. David Autor (2015), a labor economist at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology and a leading researcher in the area of automation, says that
journalists and even expert commentators tend to overstate the degree to which
automation will substitute for labor. In doing so, they often ignore how labor often
complements automation and how automation increases productivity, earnings, and
the demand for labor. Economists Daron Acemoglu and Pascual Restrepo (2018)
describe a false dichotomy that has taken hold in both the popular press and
academic circles: “On the one side are the alarmist arguments that the oncoming
advances in AI and robotics will spell the end of work by humans, while many
economists on the other side claim that because technological breakthroughs in the
past have eventually increased the demand for labor and wages, there is no reason
to be concerned that this time will be any different” (p. 1). They suggest that the
truth lies somewhere in the middle: humans will not be pushed to the sidelines, nor
will AI have a trivial effect on the labor force.
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) built an economic model to explain their
understanding of the relationship between capital and labor. This model provides a
useful context for understanding the past and provides a framework for thinking
about the future of technological advance. In this model, jobs are broken into tasks,
which serve as the central unit of production, and these tasks can be completed
either by labor or by capital. Individual tasks can be analyzed as better suited to
labor or capital such that, in any given “job,” some tasks might be automated while
others are completed with human labor. In this way, productivity is enhanced; but
human labor is still an essential part of the production process. As technology
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advances, it changes the mix of tasks completed by human labor and those
completed by robots. The model identifies the following four processes at work:
The first process is the Displacement Effect. The model assumes that both
labor and capital have comparative advantages for different tasks, which means that
each (labor and capital) have varying opportunity costs. Labor is sometimes better
suited for some tasks than capital and vice versa. In other words, the relative
productivity of labor varies across tasks. When capital is less expensive (relative to
labor) at the margin, the firm will substitute capital for labor for those tasks. The
transition occurs as automation increases the number of tasks that can be costeffectively completed using capital. On its own, the displacement effect results in
a decrease in the demand for labor and a decrease in the equilibrium wage rate.
Anxiety about automation has historically emphasized the displacement effect.
However, the model suggests that three countervailing effects are at work.
The second process is the productivity effect. Investment in capital is
intended to increase productivity. Increases in productivity decrease the cost of
production and increase the demand for labor for non-automated tasks that
complement the tasks completed by machines (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2016).
Historically, this can be seen with the advent of the ATM machine. Initially, some
feared this technology would completely substitute the labor of bank tellers, making
them obsolete. Rather, the number of bank tellers employed actually increased.
ATM technology decreased the operating costs of bank branches to the point that
banks found it advantageous to open more branches. With additional branches, they
hired additional tellers. Thus, tellers per branch might have been reduced, but more
branches overall increased employment (Bessen, 2015).
Although the number of bank tellers increased, tellers still needed to adjust
their skills to meet the demands of the changing labor market. Rather than
specializing in the tasks that ATMs had automated, tellers now specialized in
relationship banking—forging “good will” with customers and selling them other
bank services, which are difficult tasks to automate. Autor (2016) captures a similar
idea in his economic framework. In his model, humans have a comparative
advantage in tasks involving skills not easily replaced, including creativity,
building relationships, and problem solving. For example, applying his framework
to the ATM shows that ATM technology replaced some routine tasks of teller jobs,
allowing tellers to take on more cognitively demanding and relational aspects of
the banking business.
Higher productivity also has the potential to affect the demand for a broad
selection of goods and services. Since higher productivity often translates into
lower prices for goods and services, the productivity effect also leads to higher real
incomes (i.e., income adjusted for inflation) for consumers. Higher real income
results in an increase in the demand for all goods and services (including those not
automated). As the demand for goods and services increases, the demand for the
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labor which produces them also rises. For example, the mechanization of
agriculture reduced food prices, leaving households more income to spend on nonagricultural goods and services. The increased demand created employment
opportunities for those displaced by mechanization (Herrendorf, Rogerson &
Valentinyi, 2013). Overall, the productivity effect has been powerful in countering
the displacement effect. The risk of automation and AI, then, is when either is just
productive enough to bring the positive productivity gains described above
(Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2018).
The third process is the capital accumulation effect. The displacement effect
occurs when automation or AI substitutes for human labor. As technological
progress continues, older capital is increasingly replaced by even more-productive
capital. This process of “capital deepening” increases the productivity of tasks
already automated. As such, additional labor is not displaced, because labor had
already been replaced by capital. Instead, the deepening of automation further
increases productivity, with the same effects as from the productivity effect: the
demand for labor increases and real incomes for households increase as well, which
result in greater demand for goods and services.
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) argue that up to this point (the sum of the
displacement, productivity, and capital accumulation effects), automation results in
a more capital intensive production process, which increases productivity more
than wages. This increased productivity means that, on its own, the capital
accumulation effect will cause the share of labor in national income to decrease
over time. Historically, however, another force has pushed the production mix in
the other direction—making production more labor intensive.
The final process is new tasks. Throughout history, the emergence of new
jobs, industries, and tasks have complemented periods of automation. The
mechanization of agriculture in the early 20th century resulted in a large increase in
employment in factory work for new farm-related industries (Kuznets, 1966), for
example, for a growing farm equipment industry (Olmstead & Rhode, 2001) and
cotton milling (Rasmussen, 1982). Without the new demand for workers from these
new industries, it would have been impossible to employ the millions of workers
displaced from the agriculture sector. More recently, Acemoglu & Restrepo (2018)
found that about half of the employment growth from 1980 to 2010 resulted from
new tasks and job titles. Without the demand for new jobs in factory work
(production, engineering, accounting, supervision, and management) in the latter
half of the 19th and 20th centuries, it would have been nearly impossible to employ
the millions of people exiting the agricultural sector and other labor-intensive jobs
as automation replaced their jobs. Again, new tasks has the opposite effect of
automation because it generates additional labor demand and increases the share of
labor in national income.
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Even though new types of jobs arise from automation’s destruction of
traditional jobs, the transition is not necessarily a smooth one. The risk is that,
because of constraints, adjustments in the labor market will occur slowly and
weaken any productivity gains that occur in the economy at large. One primary
adjustment is the need for workers to acquire new skills, which requires the
education system to keep up with the changing demands for skills (Brynjolfsson &
McAfee, 2011). As more tasks are automated, the complementary tasks that human
labor provides will change as well. As more automation occurs, any mismatch
between skills and technologies is bound to complicate the adjustment process
(Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2018). Unfortunately, there is little concrete information
about what types of skills will complement the new technologies. Broadly, Autor
(2015) forecasts that skills such as creativity, literacy, numeracy, adaptability,
problem solving, and common sense will become increasingly important in coming
decades. Just as the education system provided the workforce with the necessary
skills to transition from an agricultural economy to an industrial economy, so again
the education system will need to be an important part of a successful transition to
the future economy.
Prediction: The Essence of AI
The year 1995 was pivotal: Microsoft released Windows 95, the U.S. government
removed the final restrictions on commercial use of the internet, and Netscape
celebrated its initial public offering (IPO). With these events, the internet moved
from a technology primarily for academia and government to one for the economic
mainstream. And frequent references to the New Economy (in 1995) suggested that
a new economic framework was in play. Economists, however, realized that this
was not a new economy per se, but rather one experiencing a technological change
to which all the old economic models still applied. Using a standard economics
framework, Agrawal, Gans, and Goldfarb (2018b) suggest that the internet was a
general purpose technology that reduced the cost of distribution, communication,
and search. And, in doing so, the internet changed nearly every industry over the
next few decades.
In many ways, recent advances in AI technology remind people of 1995—
that is, AI seems to be at a turning point. The recent advances in AI are a function
of better computing power, better algorithms, big data, and advances in machine
learning. Agrawal, Gans, and Goldfarb (2018a) argue that technologies labeled as
AI can be thought of as prediction technologies. And, because prediction is a key
input to decision making, AI has the potential to affect every decision. Advances in
AI-powered prediction have decreased the cost of prediction. And, as the law of
demand would suggest, as the cost of prediction falls, people will demand a greater
quantity of it (i.e., they will find new ways to incorporate AI prediction).
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Agrawal, Gans, and Goldfarb (2018b) define prediction as “the process of
filling in missing information. Prediction takes the information you have, often
called ‘data’ and uses it to generate information you don’t have” (page 24). They
provide simple, everyday examples: Netflix predicts which television shows and
movies you might enjoy based on what data it collects about your’s and other’s
behavior. Amazon similarly predicts which books, movies, music, and other
products you might purchase. Amazon’s Alexa, Apple’s Siri, and Google Assistant
predict what information you need when you ask them a question. Gmail predicts
which words you intend to use in your message. Pandora predicts which new songs
you might enjoy. Credit card companies predict which transactions are fraudulent.
And Google Translate predicts what you are trying to communicate and expresses
it in another language.
Advancements in AI prediction expand the range of what can be automated.
Agrawal, Gans, and Goldfarb (2018a) use the self-driving car as an example of the
difference that AI can make in programming. They explain that autonomous
vehicles have been possible for some time but have largely run on tracks or preprogrammed routes in controlled environments. Putting an autonomous vehicles on
a city street seemed improbable until recently because of the near endless “if-then”
statements required to program a car to operate in an open (and much more
complex) environment. However, recent improvements in AI prediction have
turned the if-then problem into a prediction problem, allowing self-driving cars to
emerge much earlier than people had projected just a few years ago. Rather than
having to program if-then responses for every possible scenario, engineers now
focus on a single prediction problem: What would a good human driver do? This
prediction framework is then combined with machine learning. Machine learning
is a category within the field of AI that intends to give machines the power to learn
(Agrawal, Gans, & Goldfarb, 2019). In the case of driving, the autonomous car is
equipped with cameras, radar, and lasers that act as the car’s eyes and ears. In the
training phase, as a human drives the car, the AI processes data about how the
human acts and reacts in a variety of situations. The more the AI observes the
human, the better it becomes at predicting the actions a human would take. As its
predictions becomes better, performance improves. And, at some point, the AI
becomes capable of driving the car without the human driver (Agrawal, Gans, &
Goldfarb, 2018a).
Google Translate is a good example of how AI can change a process. The
program, first offered in 2006 and built on “statistical machine translation,” initially
translated words one at a time, often leading to clumsy phrases and mistakes
(Lewis-Kraus, 2016). Then in November 2016, the quality of its translations
transformed nearly overnight when the platform switched to “neural machine
translation”—a machine learning AI strategy. With this strategy, algorithms are
used to discover patterns in the training data they are exposed to (De Jesus, 2017).
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Google translate uses this strategy in the context of human communication. As the
program is used, it identifies language patterns. It then takes what it learns and
predicts the intended translation from one language to another. The program
receives reinforcement as it collects more data. The more data it collects, the more
it learns, and the better it becomes (Agrawal, Gans, & Goldfarb, 2018b).
Prediction is valuable because it is an input into decision making, and
decision making is everywhere. But prediction is not decision making in itself.
Other decision-making inputs include data, actions, and judgment. Judgment is the
process of determining what the reward is to a particular action in a particular
environment, or knowing which predictions to make and what to do with them. At
this point, judgement is still a skill that humans contribute to the process. In short,
prediction and judgement are complements. From an economic perspective, as
prediction becomes cheaper, human decision making (judgement) becomes more
important. For example, consider radiology. AI prediction technology is already
allowing machines to detect tumors better than humans can because of its ability to
recognize patterns. Will radiologists be replaced by machines? Similar to the way
the ATM changed the jobs of bank tellers, AI will likely change the jobs of
radiologists (and many other professions). In the future, radiologists will spend
much less time looking at images. Even today, radiologists spend much of their
time working with primary care doctors, explaining the results of tests, and helping
them decide the best course of action for patients. Over time, this consulting role
will grow more important as the role of examining images is increasingly
performed by an AI prediction machine. Further, as the cost of AI imaging falls,
the amount of imaging used in the diagnosis process will likely increase. The
increase in volume can be expected to offset some of the decline in image analysis
(Agrawal, Gans, & Goldfarb, 2018b).
In summary, some key insights can be drawn from the economics of
prediction: First, as prediction becomes less costly, we use it more. Second, when
the cost of AI prediction is low, it decreases the value of its substitute (human
prediction). Third, when the cost of AI prediction is low, it increases the value of it
complements (such as data and human judgement).
How Will AI and Robotics Affect Workers?
It is clear that the use of robots has increased dramatically. In the United States
there were 0.49 robots per thousand workers in 1995. By 2017, there were 1.79
robots per thousand workers (Bharadwaj & Dvorkin, 2019)—a trend likely to
continue. McKinsey Global Institute studied tasks within more than 800
occupations to determine the percentage of a job that could be automated using
current technology. This approach is similar to the framework that Acemoglu and
Restrepo (2018) developed because it recognizes that every job is made up of many
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tasks with differing potential for automation. The study found that less than 5
percent of occupations are candidates for full automation. However, roughly 60
percent of occupations could have 30 percent or more of their tasks automated.
Because these expected changes will occur at the task level (not the job level), they
will result in significant job redefinition. For example, diagnosis of many health
issues could be effectively automated so that diagnosis and triage could be
combined in emergency rooms; this would allow doctors to focus on the most acute
or uncommon cases. Additionally, automation would allow mortgage lenders to
spend less time processing paperwork, creating more time to review the exceptions
and meet with clients. Both of these examples free the expert to focus on highervalue work (McKinsey and Company, 2017). The bottom line is that more
occupations will change than be automated away; but there will be growing pains
as displaced workers retrain and existing workers learn to use new technology.
Inevitably, continued automation will change the workplace and the types of labor
employers demand.
In the past, labor-intensive, low-wage jobs were in the most danger of being
replaced by automation. Economists suggest that AI will impact future workers
differently: the labor market will expand at the high and low ends of the job-skills
spectrum, and the greatest substitution will occur at the middle of the job-skills
spectrum, a phenomenon called employment polarization (Bharadwaj & Dvorkin,
2019).
On one end of the spectrum are high-income, cognitive jobs that require
creative problem solving and tasks complemented by technology. Job opportunities
will continue to occur in traditionally high-income sectors such as healthcare,
finance, and law (with some automation occurring in each). But Autor and
Salomons (2019) also identify a growing set of occupations they label “frontier
jobs” that involve the production, installation, and maintenance of new
technologies such as robot integration, search engine optimization, and wind
turbine maintenance.
The other end of the spectrum, which is also growing, are jobs in lowincome manual and service occupations that rely on dexterity, interpersonal
communication, and physical proximity to the job; these tasks are difficult to
automate (Autor & Dorn, 2013). For these occupations, which include home health
aides, landscapers, and maintenance workers, only a very small percentage of
activities could be automated. The McKinsey Global Institute expects that the
demographics of an aging population combined with the individual care they will
likely need will result in a large increase in jobs as registered nurses, nursing
assistants, personal care aids, and home health aides from 2016-2030 (McKinsey
and Company, 2017). The institute also forecasts increased demand for
construction workers as infrastructure is modernized and housing patterns change
and for teachers, administrators, and teaching assistants as the demand for
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education increases. Autor and Salomons (2019) identify a category of growing
occupations they label “wealth workers” that provide labor-intensive, in-person
services to affluent consumers in high-wage, urban labor markets. These
occupations include those for yoga instruction, sommelier services, pet care,
personal training, and counseling and are neither technologically advanced nor
highly paid.
Middle-income jobs are at the greatest risk from technological advance
(Bharadwaj & Dvorkin, 2019). While previous waves of automation were confined
largely to industry and agriculture, AI threatens middle-income jobs because they
often follow well-understood rules and procedures increasingly easily codified in
software and executed by computers (Autor, 2016). Computer software has already
automated several middle-income tasks in retail, wholesale, and business services.
AI-powered technologies can “retrieve information, coordinate logistics, handle
inventories, prepare taxes, provide financial services, translate complex documents,
write business reports, prepare legal briefs, and diagnose diseases” (p. 4, Acemoglu
& Restrepo, 2018). AI-powered technologies are also set to become much better at
these tasks during the next several years (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2011).
McKinsey (2014) forecasts office support positions (such as payroll clerks and data
entry) to be among the hardest hit. The shrinking of the middle class from
employment polarization could result in a more stratified society. Thus, as the
number and nature of the tasks that AI can perform increases (and threatens tasks
previously done by well-educated professionals), so will anxiety about the longterm impact of AI on the economy and society in general.
Predicting future employment is difficult because it depends on accurately
forecasting the rate of technological progress. As it turns out, previous predictions
have not been very accurate. For example, in “Why People Still Matter,” Frank
Levy and Richard Murnane (2004) argued that replicating human perception would
be difficult to automate; thus, driving in traffic would be insusceptible to
automation. Six years later, Google announced that it had modified several Toyota
Priuses to be fully autonomous (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2011). In 2003, David
Autor, Frank Levy, and Richard Murnane (2003) identified tasks they believed
were and were not susceptible to automation, with legal writing and truck driving
among those insusceptible. Current analysis suggests that advances in AI will soon
automate both legal writing and truck driving (Frey & Osborne, 2017).
Policy Responses to Automation
The two main groups providing potential policy responses to automation and AI
are those who fear the “robot apocalypse” and those who believe automation and
AI will generate more jobs than they destroy in the long run. Some who fear the
“robot apocalypse” often argue that scarcity will cease to be a problem; in other
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words, they believe that although the demand for labor will be greatly reduced as
robots do all the work, goods and services will be plentiful. In such a case, the
central economic problem will be the distribution of the goods and services
produced among the people (Autor, 2015). In essence, society will need to address
the allocation problem of who will get to consume the new abundance of goods and
services.
In our current economic system, jobs are plentiful and differences in income
largely determine who can buy goods and services. This system provides both a
strong incentive to work and an efficient system (albeit unequal) for allocating
goods and services. In a world where machines have replaced human labor, income
will be largely directed to the owners of the companies who utilize automation and
AI. This suggests that much more income will flow into the accounts of fewer,
wealthier individuals. Some fear that today’s workers will have less of an
opportunity to earn income in the future as more and more human jobs are replaced
by machine labor. In this framework, inequality has the potential to rise to a greater
(perhaps staggering) level and require resources to be allocated differently.
Mark Zuckerberg (Facebook) and Elon Musk (Tesla) suggest that the
benefits of automation and AI be used to fund continuous education and universal
basic income (UBI) (Sodha, 2017; Weller, 2017). UBI is unconditional income paid
by the government to all citizens, regardless of whether they are working or
unemployed, wealthy or impoverished. Proponents suggest this reallocation would
provide basic and sustainable consumption for households and could replace the
various welfare and assistance programs run by the state and federal governments.
Taxation would also become a central economic problem in a post-scarcity
world with few human workers. In 2017, individual income taxes generated about
48 percent of tax revenue (Office of Management and Budget). If human labor
becomes largely automated and many people no longer earn income through labor,
tax revenue would need to be generated in some other way to sustain the functions
of government. Bill Gates suggests that the government should tax the work done
by robots to compensate the workers they replace. Gates says that the tax could be
used to finance jobs taking care of the elderly and working with children in schools,
services for which human labor is well-suited. Gates also suggests the robot tax
would be useful to slow the speed of automation, which Gates sees as an added
benefit (Delany, 2017).
Economist Larry Summers (2017) disagrees with Bill Gates. He does not
believe AI will eliminate scarcity. Further, he says that because robots increase
productivity, they increase our standard of living and create wealth for society. As
such, taxing robots would reduce these benefits, which would be
counterproductive. Summers also suggests that taxing robots will likely drive
production off-shore, further hurting American workers. Rather than taxing robots,
Summers suggests a larger role for government to counter the problems with
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structural joblessness that will likely result. He suggests reforms in education and
training systems, wage subsidies for people with severe employment problems, and
major investments in infrastructure to further boost productivity and provide
employment opportunities.
Like Summers, most economists suggests that scarcity will continue to be
the basic economic problem and the new tasks that emerge from new industries will
generate enough jobs to ensure full employment in the long run. They suggest that
policy should focus on an education system that provides workers with the skills
they need to engage in a growing and changing economy.
Education: The Importance of Increasing Human Capital in the Face of
Automation
Technological advance changes the mix of tasks in the production process. Because
it changes the production process, it also changes the skills demanded by
employers. Difficulties adapting to these changing demands will cause some
workers to be displaced or forced to retrain to keep their positions (Autor, 2015).
Education has historically played a major role in mitigating the adverse effects of
labor market shifts in the wake of technological advance. For example, in the
United States, the large supply of labor displaced by the innovations in agriculture
in the early 20th century coincided with the “high school movement,” which
increased enrollment in U.S. high schools from 18 percent to 71 percent. This
dramatic increase in the human capital of the American workforce helped smooth
the transition from agriculture to industry (Goldin & Katz, 2008).
Future job growth lies in the tasks that will be developed as new industries
and tasks emerge. Economists suggest that the jobs of the future will bundle human
skills and judgment with technological skills. As such, Andrew McAfee, codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy, suggests that students pursue
a double major: one in liberal arts to develop problem-solving, creativity, and
critical-thinking skills and another in a STEM (science, technology, engineering,
and mathematics) area to develop quantitative and technological skills (Regalado,
2012). While this option is not possible for all students, it is clear that workers must
increasingly acquire the skills necessary to ensure that technology is a complement
rather than a substitute for their human capital. In the future, education will more
likely not end with a high school or post-secondary education; employability will
likely necessitate constantly upgrading skills and education as technology changes.
For educators, many have feared that education technology might someday
substitute for classroom teachers. Acemoglu, Laibson, and List (2014) use the
economic theory of comparative advantage to argue that the Internet will not
substitute for teachers, but rather lead to specialization in teaching tasks. They
argue that the Internet is more likely to replace the lecture and information
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transmission aspect of education and increase the demand for teachers who
specialize in face-to-face student interaction to lead discussions and active learning.
They suggest that online lectures and content will give all students access to
“superstar” instructors, which will reduce education inequalities for those in
underserved communities.
Of course, the challenge is to provide an education system that supplies the
skills and training now for jobs and tasks that will exist in the future—but are
currently unknown. If the education system is not able to provide workers with the
necessary skills (problem-solving and critical-thinking skills as well as quantitative
and technical training), adjustment to the new economic conditions will be
impeded. Any mismatch between skills and technologies will slow the adjustment
of employment and wages (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2018). Slow adjustment will
impact the welfare of displaced workers, but it will also impact the potential
productivity enhancements to the economy more broadly. In short, if certain skills
are complementary to new technologies but those skills are lacking in the labor
force, the productivity gains will be smaller than what they could have been. The
danger is that productivity-enhancing automation replaces labor but does not
increase productivity enough to increase the demand for the non-automated tasks
that complement the automation (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2018).
Social Studies Education and Automation and AI
It is essential that people see beyond the fear of the “robot apocalypse” and make
rational decisions about their human capital. In order for students, parents, teachers,
and policymakers to make good economic decisions about the future, they must
have a solid foundation of economic knowledge and the ability to use the economic
way of thinking—a rational, decision-making model built on a foundation of
scarcity, tradeoffs, and opportunity cost. Upon that foundation, teachers can build
a framework more specific to automation and AI, such as knowledge about labor
markets, productivity, and the roles of human and physical capital. While these tend
to be seen as economics-specific concepts, they can be introduced into any of the
social studies disciplines. In fact, these concepts are core to the C3 Social Studies
Standards, the National Voluntary Content Standards in Economics, and many state
standards. For example, automation and AI issues tie directly to the C3 Social
Studies Framework by addressing topics central to understanding the national
economy and requiring high school students to “explain why advancements in
technology and investments in capital goods and human capital increase economic
growth and standards of living” (D2.Eco.13.9-12). The issues also align with the
same dimension at lower grade levels (D2.Eco.13.K-2, D2.Eco.13.3-5, and
D2.Eco.13.6-8) as well as the C3 Framework in civics, history, and geography. In
addition, automation and AI issues and the core concepts described above also align
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with several of the Voluntary National Content Standards in Economics, including
#1 (Scarcity), #2 (Decision Making), #4 (Incentives), #6 (Specialization), #13
(Income), and #15 (Economic Growth).
A variety of resources are available now: The National Council for the
Social Studies offers ready-made classroom resources that align with the economic
content. Day (2018) provides a lesson that applies the Inquiry Design Model (IDM)
and C3 Framework to the topic by asking the inquiry question “Should We Tax
Robots?” He includes three supporting questions that align well with the content in
this article: 1) What is the effect of technology in the workplace?, 2) What is the
effect of technology at home?, and 3) What is the effect of technology on
employment in the U.S. economy? The lesson uses a variety of sources for students
to investigate the topic, including a picture of a factory in the 1960s and comparison
picture of a factory in the 2010s, a transcript from an interview with Bill Gates (who
comments on the issue of taxing robots), U.S manufacturing data, U.S.
unemployment data, and interview data gathered by students. To provide students
an overview, Social Education published “The Economics of Artificial Intelligence
and Robotics” (Wolla, Schug, & Wood, 2019).
The concepts identified in this present paper can be built into any social
studies course. Proper scaffolding might involve starting with foundational
concepts such as scarcity and opportunity cost and then moving to economic
systems, labor markets, productivity, and investment in human capital. Free
teaching resources on these topics are widely available from reliable sources such
as the Council for Economic Education, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and
Federal Reserve Banks of Dallas, Richmond, and St. Louis (Table 1).
Table 1: Teaching Resources

Key Concept: Scarcity
Opportunity Cost (online learning module)
This course introduces opportunity cost, a fundamental concept in economics. An understanding
of opportunity cost contributes to informed decision making at the personal and societal levels.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
https://www.econlowdown.org/resource-gallery/opportunity_cost
There is No Such Thing as a Free Lunch (video)
The study of economics is built on the foundation of three very important concepts: scarcity,
choice, and opportunity cost. This episode of the Economic Lowdown Video Series explains why
there is no such thing as a free lunch.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
https://www.stlouisfed.org/education/economic-lowdown-video-series/no-such-thing-free-lunch
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Key Concept: Economic Systems
Circular Flow (video)
This episode of the Economic Lowdown Video Series explains the circular flow model. Viewers
will learn how households and businesses interact in the market for resources and in the market
for goods and services and see how money keeps the whole process moving.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
https://www.stlouisfed.org/education/economic-lowdown-video-series/episode-6-circular-flow
Factors of Production (podcast)
Factors of production are the resources people use to produce goods and services; they are the
building blocks of the economy. Economists divide the factors of production into four categories:
land, labor, capital, and entrepreneurship.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
https://www.stlouisfed.org/education/economic-lowdown-podcast-series/episode-2-factors-ofproduction

Key Concept: Labor Markets
Who Decides Wage Rates? (lesson)
In this lesson, students play the role of either buyers or sellers of labor to examine the
interconnectedness of individuals and companies in labor markets. Students learn that the demand
and supply for labor determine market wage rates and that wages depend, in part, on individual
productivity.
Source: High School Economics (lesson 13), Council for Economic Education
http://hseconomics.councilforeconed.org/
The Labor Market (video)
This episode of the Economic Lowdown Video Series explains the basics of the labor market.
Viewers will learn how the laws of supply and demand determine the wages and quantities of
labor employed in various labor markets.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
https://www.stlouisfed.org/education/economic-lowdown-video-series/episode-4-the-labormarket

Key Concept: Productivity
Will Robots Take Our Jobs? (article)
Robots are in the headlines, and many of us wonder if they’ll also take over our jobs. Is the “Robot
Apocalypse” upon us, or is this part of a larger trend that’s been occurring for much of human
history? This issue of Page One Economics® discusses that and more.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
https://www.stlouisfed.org/education/page-one-economics-classroom-edition/will-robots-takeour-jobs
What is Productivity? (video)
Explore the meaning of productivity with the Bureau of Labor Statistics and learn how
productivity growth can lead to improvements in our lives and the well-being of our nation.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
https://www.bls.gov/video/?video=mRxICdUYaCs
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Key Concept: Investment in Human Capital
Invest in What’s Next: Life After High School (online module)
This online course helps high school students evaluate their choices for their first major financial
decision—what path to pursue after high school. The three online lessons include Exploring My
Options, Budgeting for My Future, and Evaluating My Plan.
Source: Federal Reserve Banks of Richmond and San Francisco
https://www.investinwhatsnext.org/
Navigate: Exploring College and Careers After High School (workbook)
This resource is an introduction to the investigation of careers and college and is designed for 7th
through 9th grade students. Many students and their families may not be familiar with the
pathways to education after high school, and Navigate provides information to begin preparing
for success.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
https://www.dallasfed.org/educate/navigate.aspx

Conclusion
Many people suffer from anxiety about technology and its effects on the workforce;
they imagine a world where human labor has been displaced by robots and the
distribution of goods and services (not scarcity) is the central problem. While the
general population has concerns about how automation and AI will affect the
economy, economists are generally optimistic about their effects (Autor, 2015).
Productivity-enhancing technology has changed the economy in dramatic ways
over the past two centuries, but it has not made human labor obsolete or eliminated
the problem of scarcity. In 1966, another period of automation anxiety, economist,
computer scientist, and Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon wrote, “Insofar as there are
economic problems at all, the world’s problems in this generation and the next are
problems of scarcity, not of intolerable abundance. The bogeyman of automation
consumes worrying capacity that should be saved for real problems” (Simon, 1966).
This statement is still true today.
Many economists see the current wave of new technology and automation
as a trend that has been occurring for most of human history and one that will
continue in the future (Autor, 2015). The challenge in their view it to equip workers
with the skills needed in the future to complement emerging technology—to avoid
being substituted by it (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2018). This challenge has
implications not only for the choices of students and parents, but also for the
decisions of schools and governments as they choose how much to invest, what
parts of the curriculum to invest in, and what academic standards will be required
and tested.
Automation and AI provide social studies educators with a topic that is
current and relevant, has historical context, and provides opportunities to connect
to ideas embedded throughout the social studies curriculum. Social studies
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educators can contribute by ensuring students have the understanding they need to
make sound decisions about their economic futures. Overall, while technological
progress creates uncertainty, education has the potential to mitigate many of the
adverse effects of labor market disruptions and alleviate the fear surrounding the
growth of automation and AI.
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